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Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

/026 W
---------- 001788
O P 221800 Z MAY 73
FM USDEL SALT TWO II
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2004
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0207

EXDIS/ SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652: XGDSI
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: SEMENOV STATEMENT, MAY 22, 1973

FOLLOWING IS THE TRANSLATION OF THE STATEMENT
PRESENTED BY MINISTER SEMENOV, TUESDAY, MAY 22, 1973.

SEMENOV STATEMENT, MAY 22, 1973

TODAY THE USSR DELEGATION WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE
SETTING FORTH ITS CONSIDERATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS UNDER
DISCUSSION.

THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH
RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WAS
THE RESULT OF LONG AND PAINSTAKING WORK WHICH CULMINATED
AT THE SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN THE LEADERS OF THE USSR
AND THE U. S. IN MAY 1972 IN MOSCOW. THE PROVISIONS
CONTAINED THEREIN ARE BALANCED AND DEEPLY FOUNDED. THE
OBJECTIVE COURSE OF EVENTS SHOWS QUITE CONVINCENGLY THAT
THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IS IN ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF
EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.
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THIS AGREEMENT EXERTS A FAVORABLE INFLUENCE NOT ONLY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES BUT ALSO ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS A WHOLE. THE HIGH ASSESSMENT OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BY THE HIGHEST LEADERS OF OUR COUNTRIES SHOWS THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF ITS PROVISIONS FOR BOTH SIDES. NOR CAN WE LOSE SIGHT OF THE INCONTESTABLE FACT OF THE POSITIVE INFLUENCE OF THIS AGREEMENT UPON THE INTER-ANTIONAL POLITICAL CLIMATE, ESPECIALLY IN TERMS OF INTRODUCING GREATER STABILITY INTO THE RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES AND CONFIDENCE IN THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH STABILITY, AS WELL AS A TREND TOWARD ITS FURTHER STRENGHTENING IN ALL DIRECTIONS.

THIS IS A VERY IMPORTANT FACTOR. AND IN THE LIGHT OF THIS THERE IS EVIDENTLY NO DOUBT THAT IT IS DESIRABLE TO CONSOLIDATE AND DEVELOP THE RESULTS ACHIEVED IN MOSCOW IN MAY OF 1972 AND TO USE THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AS A RELIABLE POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR ACHIEVING AN UNDERSTANDING ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

FORM THIS POINT OF VIEW IT IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE TO FIND WAYS FOR TRANSFORMING THE INTERIM AGREEMENT INTO A PERMANENT TREATY, WITH AN APPROPRIATE EXPANSION OF ITS CONTENT.

AS TO THE CONTENT OF SUCH A TREATY, THE USSR DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT IT SHOULD NOT ONLY AMOUNT TO LIMITING THOSE TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE EWAPONS WHICH ARE ALREADY LIMITED BY THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, BUT THAT IT SHOULD ALSO PLACE CON-STRAINTS ON THOSE TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, WHICH ARE NOT COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT, AND ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHER FACTORS OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION.

ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS IN AN UNDERSTANDING ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES IS THAT OF ESTABLISHING LEVELS FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, BOTH SIDES ARE IN AGREEMENT ON THIS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE ONCE AGAIN THAT IN CONSIDERING THIS QUESTION ONE CANNOT ADDRESS THE LEVELS OF ONLY A PORTION OF ARMAMENTS WITHOUT AT THE SAME TIME TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHER, NO LESS IMPORTANT, PORTION OF SUCH

ARMAMENTS, AS WELL AS OTHER FACTORS SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENCING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION. IT IW WELL KNOWN THAT IN DEVELOPING ITS STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS EACH SIDE RESOLVED IN ITS OWN WAY THE QUESTION OF THEIR CONSTRUCTION, THEIR COMPOSITION, LEVELS OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF WEAPONS AND THE RATIO AMONG THEM, ON THE BASIS OF DIFFERENT CON-CRETE CONDITIONS. THEREFORE AGREEMENT ON RESOLVING THE

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QUESTION OF ESTABLISHING LEVELS FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
WEAPONS CAN BE FOUND ONLY AS A RESULT OF CONSIDERATION
OF ALL ASPECTS AND FACETS OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION ON THE
BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY
OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, RECOGNIZED BY BOTH SIDES. THE
COMPLEXITIES OF SUCH AN APPROACH ARE OBVIOUS, BUT THEY
MERELY REFLECT THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE OBJECTIVELY EXISTING
SITUATION AND OF THE TASK ASSIGNED TO US. BUT THIS CANNOT
DISCOURAGE US, PARTICULARLY SINCE WE ALREADY HAVE THE
SOLUTIONS FOUND BY OUR STATES FOR LIMITATION OF ABM
SYSTEMS AND FOR ADIPTION OF CERTAIN MEASURES WITH
RESPECT TO LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. AND WE
ALSO HAVE THE BENEFIT OF EXPERIENCE IN FINDING THESE
SOLUTIONS, OF THAT WHICH IS VALUABLE AND POSITIVE AND
WAS ACQUIRED BY BOTH SIDES IN COMMON AS A RESULT OF
THE WORK PERFORMED, TO WHICH BOTH SIDES HAD FARSIGHTEDLY
ATTACHED IMMENSE IMPORTANCE FROM THE VERY BEGINNING
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0207

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ALL THIS LEADS TO THE CONSLUSION THAT AN UNDERSTANDING
ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
ARMS MUST INCLUDE THE PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM
AGREEMENT IN THE FORM IN WHICH THEY WERE AGREED BETWEEN
THE SIDES AND ALSO PROVIDE FOR LIMITING THOSE TYPES OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, WHICH WERE NOT COVERED BY

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THE AGREEMENT. IN PROPOSING PRECISELY SUCH A SOLUTION
FOR THIS PROBLEM, THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS ABOVE ALL FORM
THE COINCIDING VIEWS OF THE SIDES TO THE EFFECT THAT THE
INTERIM AGREEMENT IS A MAJOR STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF
CURBING AND ULTIMATELY HALTING THE ARMS RACE. AS YOU KNOW,
IN NEGOTIATING THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THE INTERIM
AGREEMENT, THE SIDES VERY THOROUGHLY AND COMPREHENSIVELY
CONSIDERED A MULTITUDE OF QUESTIONS, BOTH OF A POLITICAL AND
MILITARY- TECHNICAL NATURE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT TO A
CERTAIN DEGREE THE RELEVANT ASPECTS OF THE STRATEGIC
SITUATION. THEREFORE THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
INTERIM AGREEMENT, NOW IN FORCE, WHICH WERE AGREED
BETWEEN THE SIDES, INCLUDING THOSE ON QUESTIONS OF
LIMITING ICBMS, SLBMS AND SUBMARINES, ARE MUTUALLY
ACCEPTABLE AND MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS, AND DO NOT REQUIRE
CHANGING IN THE CONTEXT OF WORKING OUT A FUTURE UNDER-
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STANDING ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES.

THE SIDES ARE OF ONE MIND TO THE EFFECT THAT AN UNDER-
STANDING ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES MUST ALSO PROVIDE
FOR ESTABLISHING AGREED LIMITATIONS WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC
AVIATION. THE ABSENCE OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE LIMITATIONS ON
STRATEGIC AIRCRAFT AND THEIR ARMAMENTS WOULD LEAVE OPEN A
SUBSTANTIAL CHANNEL FOR A BUILD- UP IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
ARMS AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE CREATION OF CONDITIONS
FOR AN ARMS RACE IN THIS FIELD. ESTABLISHMENT OF AGREED
LIMITS ON STRATEGIC AIRCRAFT AND THEIR ARMAMENTS WOULD
BLOCK A SUBSTANTIAL CHANNEL FOR A BUILD- UP IN STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO MAINTAINING
STRATEGIC STABILITY AND STRENGTHENING SECURITY.

MR. AMBASSADOR, WE ASLO PROCEED FROM THE AGREED
VIEW THAT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A FUTURE UNDERSTANDING,
SUBJECT TO OBSERVANCE OF AGREED LIMITATIONS, MODERNIZA-
TION AND REPLACEMENT WOULD BE PERMITTED, AS WELL AS
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
ARMS. THE NUMBER OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AS
WELL AS OTHER STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS INTENDED FOR
TESTING AND TRAINING WOULD BE LIMITED BY AGREED LEVELS.
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